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Abstract—Comparing to well protected data frames, Wi-Fi
management frames (MFs) are extremely vulnerable to various
attacks. Since MFs are transmitted without encryption or authen-
tication, attackers can easily launch various attacks by forging the
MFs. In a collaborative environment with many Wi-Fi sniffers,
such attacks can be easily detected by sensing the anomaly RSS
changes. However, it is quite difficult to identify these spoofing
attacks without assistance from other nodes.
By exploiting some unique characteristics (e.g., rapid spatial
decorrelation, independence of Txpower, and much richer dimen-
sions) of 802.11n Channel State Information (CSI), we design
and implement CSITE, a prototype system to authenticate the
Wi-Fi management frames on PHY layer merely by one station.
Our system CSITE, built upon off-the-shelf hardware, achieves
precise spoofing detection without collaboration and in-advance
fingerprint. Several novel techniques are designed to address the
challenges caused by user mobility and channel dynamics. To
verify the performances of our solution, we conduct extensive
evaluations in various scenarios. Our test results show that
our design significantly outperforms the RSS-based method. We
observe about 8 times improvement by CSITE over RSS-based
method on the falsely accepted attacking frames.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wi-Fi technology is on its rapid evolution. IEEE 802.11n
and its successor 802.11ac supports more than 600Mbps
throughput. 802.11i amendment, or WPA2 encryption, pro-
vides safe data exchange. However, an attacker can still launch
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [1]–[3] easily, breaking the
connection between AP and client, establishing rogue AP,
and even performing Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. To
varying degrees, all these attacks exploit a main vulnerability
of the 802.11 system, that the Management Frames (MFs),
which are indispensable to the normal operation of Wi-Fi,
has not been protected by any security measures [4]. Hence,
attackers can forge the MFs simply using a laptop with an
injection-enable wireless NIC.
Sequence Number (SN) based spoofing detection can be
bypassed if the SN of attacking frames follows the original
pattern. IEEE 802.11w amendment seeks to protect several
key MFs by encryption-based authentication, it still has some
vulnerabilities identified in recent researches [5], [6]. The Mac
address spoofing attacks can be easily detected by Wireless
Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) or similar systems [7]–[9].
The power of WIDS roots on the collaboration of many Wi-Fi
sensors dispersed in the environment. These sensors overhear
the Wi-Fi traffic and cooperate in detecting the anomaly
Received Signal Strength (RSS) variation for the same MAC
addresses. However, due to its high deployment cost, WIDS
is not common for public environment. Because of its high
correlation with transmit power (Txpower) and distance, RSS
is naturally more suitable for localization [10]–[13] rather
than spoofing detection. Hence, without collaboration from
other nodes, RSS-based spoofing detection can be bypassed
by Txpower scanning.
In search of a MFs authentication mechanism which sup-
ports operating independently on a single station, we focus on
the 802.11n PHY-layer information, Channel State Information
(CSI), which is a large complex-number matrix that reveals the
Channel Frequency Response (CFR) for each subcarrier of the
underlying 802.11a/g/n OFDM system. CSI has some unique
advantages, e.g., rapid spatial decorrelation, independence of
Txpower, and rich data dimensions. After some proof-of-
concept experiments, we believe CSI is an ideal alternative
to RSS-based spoofing detection.
Based on these advantages, we design CSITE, a CSI-based
management frame authentication system using off-the-shelf
NICs. The idea is simple yet effective: regardless of the frame
type, data or management frames the transmission between
AP and legitimate stations undergoes the same channel fading.
Consequently, their CSI are exactly the same. If an attacker
injects a forged MF, the CSI of this frame must be quite
different to the CSI trend learnt from previously accepted
frames, thus we consider that this frame is suspicious.
Our CSITE system is based on a reasonable security as-
sumption that the data frames with strong encryption, e.g.,
WPA2 under AES encryption with a strong password, is
very hard to be cracked in a relatively short time [14]. As
a result, an attacker cannot forge a data frame that can be
correctly decrypted by legitimate stations, hence the encrypted
data frames which are correctly received and decrypted are
considered to be sent from genuine stations, and the CSI of
these frames are deemed to be the fingerprint of the wireless
channel between genuine stations.
Despite an elegant solution, there are three main challenges
that should be carefully addressed:
First, compared to one-dimensional temporal RSS data, the
CSI information for each frame is a large complex number
matrix of the size Ntx×Nrx×30, where Ntx and Nrx denote
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2the number of transmitting and receiving antennas respectively.
Learning the CSI pattern and Identifying anomaly data points
in such a high-dimensional data stream are big challenges
when the frame receiving rate fr is high.
Second, it is the spatial decorrelation that makes CSI
unforgeable, but this also makes the authentication intolerable
to frequently-happened channel dynamics, e.g., those caused
by crowd flow or user mobility. In such conditions, there are
inevitably some genuine MFs that are rejected. A mechanism
should be carefully devised to guarantee the delivery of every
genuine MF.
Third, transmitting all frames in "HT" rate is allowed
in 802.11n Sepc., and it is indispensable for measuring
CSI. However, most MAC layer implementation still use the
802.11a/g compatible code which transmits the MFs in legacy
rate.
In our work, an accurate and efficient CSI-based attack-
ing detector is first designed. Since MF only occupies a
small portion of normal traffic, high accuracy checking can
be achieved without affecting network throughput. To cope
with the channel dynamics, we devise a method called "CSI
Resolution Enhancement" (CRE) to ensure the transmission of
legitimate MF even under highly intensive channel dynamics.
Since it is standard-permitted and technically possible for
sending management frames in "HT" rate, we modify the
MAC layer implementation and NIC drivers to enable the
transmission of management frames in "HT" rate.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows. We design CSITE, a cross-layer system based on
CSI to perform PHY-layer source authentication for Wi-Fi
management frames. In addition to the natural advantages of
single-station accurate authentication, CSITE can also cope
with user mobility, and no cooperation or in-advance finger-
print is required. We implement a prototype of CSITE using
the off-the-shelf hardware and conduct extensive studies on
the performance of our method in various scenarios. Our
evaluations show that CSITE has excellent performance on ac-
curacy, robustness, and efficiency. It significantly outperforms
the RSS-based method in the same scenarios. For example,
when the client and the attacker are walking with regular
speed, CSITE accepts some attacking frames with probability
about 2%, while RSS-based method accepts attacking frames
with probability about 18% for the same scenario. When only
the client is moving, we observe similar improvement (about
8 times) by CSITE over RSS-based method on the falsely
accepted attacking frames. A more significant improvement is
obtained in stationary scenarios, see Section IV for details.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to exploit the
unique characteristics (e.g., rapid spatial decorrelation, inde-
pendence to Txpower, and rich dimensions) of off-the-shelf
platform’s Channel State Information (CSI) for authenticating
management frames in Wi-Fi networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents some preliminaries and reviews related works. Sec-
tion III describes the CSITE system design. A series of
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Fig. 1. An example of CSI data. Since Intel 5300agn NIC has 3 antennas,
there will be 3*30 subcarriers information for each MAC layer frames. For
visual clarity, here we show only 40 frames.
experimental results and analysis are shown in Section IV. We
discuss the compatibility and other security issues in Section V
and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we first give a brief review of OFDM, CSI,
and 802.11n, which are the foundations of CSITE design. Then
a review of related works are presented.
A. OFDM, 802.11n, and CSI
802.11a/g/n adopt Orthogonal Frequency Division Multi-
plexing (OFDM) technology. In OFDM, the overall wide
bandwidth channel is divided into many small but orthogonal
sub-carriers. Thus for OFDM system, channel estimation is
equivalent to measuring the parameters of all the subcarriers.
In 802.11n and its successor 802.11ac, Channel State Informa-
tion (CSI) is a large complex-number matrix which describes
the channel frequency response (CFR) for each subcarrier in
every spatial stream. Each complex value h in CSI matrix
could be transformed to polar coordinates that
h = |h| ej∠h
where |h| and ∠h denote the amplitude and phrase of each
subcarrier. Fig. 1 presents the amplitude of CSI samples.
B. Related Works
Numerous researches claim to have the ability to detect
MAC-layer spoofing attacks based on RSS or Sequence Num-
ber (SN). However, Txpower can be adjusted to forge the same
RSS level, while SN could be forged by following the original
pattern. Fingerprint based on hardware transceiver profile is
thought to be a perfect solution [15], but advanced attacker
using arbitrary waveform generator, can still compromise the
fingerprint [16].
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) or similar
systems [7], [17], [18] can provide reliable attacking detection
in secured environment, but these approaches are limited due
to the deployment of monitor stations. To the best of our
3knowledge, the most advanced RSS-based detection is the
RCVI [19]. This work cleverly exploits the reciprocity of
RSS variance in mobile wireless networks. By detecting the
mis-matched RSS variation, an Identity-based Attack (IBA) is
detected. However, RCVI require the sender to report the RSS
records of the latest received ACK frames, which is a slightly
high requirement.
There are growing interests in authentication, location dis-
tinction and even localization based on physical layer infor-
mation. Channel Impulse Response (CIR) has been used to
provide robust location distinction in [20], [21]. There are
some works [22]–[24] that went further trying to provide
precise indoor localization either by identifying the Line-Of-
Sight components or by identifying cluster information in CSI.
A new attack against PHY-layer authentication called
mimicry was identified in [25]. However, such attack is neither
easy to launch due to the existence of symbol sensor, and it
is not likely to succeed due to the MIMO configuration which
introduces richer channel information.
III. CSITE DESIGN
In this section, we will first present some of our observations
on which the design of CSITE are based. Then the design of
CSITE is presented in details.
A. CSI for Packet Authentication
CSI, in contrast to RSS, decorrelates with spatial posi-
tion quite rapidly [26]. The correlation efficient ρ between
two CSI samples may quickly drop to 0 if the sampling
locations are apart merely more than half a wavelength. It
means once sufficiently distant, an attacker cannot estimate
the victim’s CSI based on the CSI measured locally. Besides
the decorrelation with position, CSI also has very low correla-
tion with Txpower, therefore the traditional Txpower-scanning
attacks cannot fool CSI-based detection. Third, CSI is a high-
dimensional data [27]. For a 3×3 802.11n MIMO transferred
frame, there are 270 values in the CSI matrix. Apparently
it is of great difficulty to forge the CSI even under most
sophisticated preparation.
A simple attack experiment is conducted to observe the
characteristics of CSI. We collected 3000 frames, among
which the first 1500 frames are from legitimate station, while
the following 1500 frames include frames from both attackers
and legitimate station. Fig.2 (a) shows the CSI amplitude of
the sample packets, where different colors denote different
amplitudes. We can see the attacker starts injecting a group of
attacking frames periodically after the 1500th frame, and the
visual difference between the legitimate and injected frames
is very clear. Fig.2 (b) shows the empirical probability density
function (PDF) of subcarrier 20 collected from the first 1500
frames by directly plotting the Re(h) and Im(h) dots, where
h is the CSI for this subcarrier. Since the amplitude is stable
during the test and the phase is distributed between 0 to
2pi, we observed a ring-shaped structure with narrow width.
Fig.2 (c) shows the PDF of all the CSI for subcarrier 20.
Due to the amplitude difference between the legitimate and
injected frames, a double-ring shaped structure is presented.
Such amplitude difference can be used to detect the attacking
frames.
B. CSITE Architecture
We are now ready to discuss the architecture of our CSITE
prototype for authenticating MF frames in Wi-Fi environment.
The CSITE system consists of two parts: CSITE filter
and MF transmission assurance system. The CSITE filter
implements our CSI-based spoofing detection algorithm, and
its goal is to detect and reject any suspicious MFs. However,
the safety and efficiency are always contradictory. In dynamic
environment, CSITE filter may also reject some legitimate
MFs. In such case, the sender should take measures to ensure
the successful delivery of legitimate MFs without compromis-
ing the security standard of receiver’s CSITE filter, and this is
achieved by the MF transmission assurance system.
Since routine data frames are naturally used to update
CSI pattern, we don’t exert extra burden to network traffic.
However to cope with the burst of transmission and asymmetry
between uplink and downlink, we set a maximum interval
Tim between two CSI updates. Once a station has not been
updated for a time duration exceeding Tim, it will send a
ICMP "Probe Request/Reply" probe to force a CSI probe.
Then the update frequency, denoted as fs, of a station would be
max(1/Tim, fdl), where fdl denotes the downlink data frames
frequency.
C. CSITE filter
The mission of CSITE filter is quite clear. Let SY denote
the frame stream received by a station, and SY is composed of
three parts: SY = {Sd, Sm, Sin}. Here {Sd} and {Sm} are the
encrypted data frames stream and management frames stream
sent from genuine station, respectively. {Sin} is the forged
frames stream sent by attackers using injection tools. Our
mission is to determine, for each newly arrived management
frame M , whether it’s sent from genuine station or attacker
based on the CSI pattern learnt from Sd. On designing such
an filter, there are two technical requirements:
• Low False Positive (FP) error: Classifying frames into
“legitimate” or “suspicious” frames may introduce two errors:
wrongfully accepting an attacking frame (called false negative
(FP) hereafter), and wrongfully rejecting a legitimate frame
(called false Negative (FN) hereafter). Since re-transmission
can be launched once a delivery fails, the FN error is tolerable
to some extent. However, due to the high risk of successive
attacks (e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks) triggered by some
spoofing attacks, such as de-authentication attack, the FP error
is absolutely not acceptable.
• Low overhead: In a real world environment, network
throughput could be very high, large computation and com-
munication overhead for attacking detection will significantly
degrade the network performance.
Due to the rapid spatial decorrelation, the CSI of spoofing
frames are highly probable to be "distant" from the CSI of
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Fig. 2. (a) Amplitude of CSI sample where warmer colors denote larger amplitudes. Attacking frames are injected starting from frame number 1500. (b)
PDF for sub-carrier 20 of the first 1500 frames, where the value (denoted by colors) at a point is the number of frames with this CSI. (c) PDF for sub-carrier
20 of all samples, including attacking frames.
legitimate frames. Thus, detecting spoofing frames can be
viewed as an online anomaly detection problem and the goal
is to identify such "distant points".
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [28] is a common solution for
high-dimensional anomaly detection [29]. Notice that because
a MF frame is said to be suspicious if it significantly de-
viates from the trend of most recently accepted frames, the
“anomaly” detection for the problem studied in this paper also
needs to consider the temporal distance of the frames. Thus,
traditional KNN algorithms cannot be directly applied here. To
reflect the impact of the timing characteristics of all frames,
our distance metric takes both spatial and temporal distance
into account. An self-adaptive threshold is determined to clas-
sify a CSI point into two categories "trusted" or "suspicious".
However, before introducing the algorithm, we should first
reduce the data point dimension.
Dimensionality Reduction: Due to the high dimensions of
CSI data point, it will consume large computational resource
to perform anomaly detection if all dimensions are taken into
consideration. Even we set the MIMO Tx-antenna Ntx = 1
and Rx-antenna Nrx = 3 for our prototype, the dimension of
the CSI data point for each frame is Dim(SH) = Ntx×Nrx×
30 = 90, which is still too large, especially for AP, which is
going to handle multiple connections.
As phase is distributed between 0 to 2pi which provides no
discriminative information, the complex number data point H
is first reduced to a real number data point containing only the
amplitude A = |H|. Since amplitudes of subcarriers exhibit
certain continuous structure as shown in Fig.1, we can further
merge the adjacent amplitudes. In our system, every 2 adjacent
amplitudes are merged to their mean as (Ai +Ai+1)/2.
Frame Authenticity Verification: To verify the claimed au-
thenticity, each receiver holds a sliding window Wr to store
the latest verified CSI points with a length LW . Determining
whether a MF is from genuine station is equivalent to deter-
mining how distant a MF is from to the CSI trend in Wr. If the
incoming MF frame perfectly follows the trend, it is highly
likely to be a true MF; otherwise it is suspicious. We will
use the "degree of following" (DoF) (exact definition will be
given later) to characterize how closely a newly received MF
M follows the trend defined by frames in the sliding window
Wr. This DoF is determined by two factors: the distance to
its k nearest points in the window Wr and the time difference
between M ’s arrival time tM and the arrival time of its k
nearest points.
Suppose there are n dimensions in each data point after di-
mensionality reduction. We first define the Euclidean distance
between CSI point A and B as dist(A,B) = (
∑n
i=1(Ai −
Bi)
2)
1
2 . The following coefficient between these two points is
defined as follow:
fc(A,B) = eλ(|tA−tB |)
where λ is a constant called time gain factor and tA denotes
the arrival time of point A. We then define the "time-gain
distance" between point A and B as
tgd(A,B) = dist(A,B)·fc(A,B)
Let N tgdk (M,Wr) = {P1, P2, · · · , Pk} be the k-NN of M
from the sliding window Wr under the TGD distance. The
"Degree of Following" (DoF) of a new arrival management
frame M is then defined as
DoF (M) =
∑k
i=1 tgd(M,Pi),
k
|Pi ∈ N tgdk (M,Wr) (1)
Dynamic Threshold Scaling (DTS) : We use threshold τ to
decide whether to accept a newly arrived frame M : the M is
considered to be legitimate iff DoF (M) < τ . Recall that the
premier goal of CSITE is to prevent FP error, the τ should
be adjusted adaptively to defend attacks even under highly
dynamic environment. Based on a reasonable assumption that
the DoF of a newly arrived legitimate MF M is highly
probable to be similar to the DoFs of the recently accepted
5frames. Thus in our system τ is determined according to the
latest DoFs. Let Qb(Wr) denote the most recently accepted
b-th point in the window Wr. Instead of using simple mean
or median, the τ is set to i-th percentile of DoFs of recently
accepted points, âA˘c´et al.
τ = pi({DoF (Qb(Wr)) | 1 ≤ b ≤ k}) (2)
where pi(S) denotes the ith percentile function. Although
Eq. (2) requires k × Lw calculation, it can be optimized by
pre-caching the distance matrix between points Pi and Pj .
Here the right selection of percentile i is vital for the system.
When there is little channel dynamics, average DoFs of
recently accepted frames could be very low. It may cause more
FN error (reject the legitimate MF), thus slightly higher i is
preferred. While there is intensive channel dynamics, average
DoFs of recently accepted frames could be very high. In such
case the DoF of a legitimate MF is not necessarily lower
than the DoF of an attacking frame, thus lower i is preferred
for security concerns. An negative correlation between i and
Channel Stability is needed.
In CSITE, we define the channel stability σW as the mean of
the standard variance of the differences between two adjacent
CSI points that
σW = (stdn(|Pj − Pj+1|)), n ∈ [1, Dim(Pi)], j ∈ [1, Lw−1]
where stdn stands for the standard variance for nth dimension
of the CSI in window. We then define an effective negative
correlation between i and σW as i1 =
i0
σW /σrW
, where i0 is
set to 75 as default, and σrW denotes the reference σW , which
is measured during the CSITE initialization.
Based on the definition of DoF (M), τ , and i, we design
our source authentication algorithm as shown in Algorithm.1.
Algorithm 1 Spoofing Frame Detection Algorithm
Input:
The CSI amplitude of a newly received frame H;
The encryption property of H ,
attren(H) ∈ {encrypted, unencrypted}
Output: A security classification of H ,
attrsec(H) ∈ {trusted, suspicious}
1: for each new arrival frame H do
2: if attren(H) == encrypted then
3: sliding window Wr move forward to include H
4: attrsec(H) = trusted
5: else
6: calculate the DoF (H) according to eq.1
7: calculate the τ according to eq.2
8: if DoF (H) ≤ τ then
9: sliding window Wr move forward to include H
10: attrsec(H) = trusted
11: else
12: attrsec(H) = suspicious
D. MF transmission assurance system
Due to the rapid spatial decorrelation and the negative
correlation between i and σW , the CSITE filter is more likely
to reject than to accept any suspicious frames. In dynamic
environment, it is even harder to classify a MF into "trusted"
due to the large noise. How to guarantee the delivery of
legitimate MFs in any case is a big problem.
Despite rapid spatial decorrelation, wireless signal propaga-
tion can be well modeled as an analogue continuous system.
In this system when sampling rate fs → ∞, the differences
between each sampling ∆D → 0. It means when the frame
rates is high enough, we can see very smoothed and slow-
changing CSI amplitude surface under intensive channel dy-
namics. Fig. 3 presents a proof-of-concept experiment. During
the experiment, large files are transmitted in HT rate between
fast-moving stations, Fig. 3(a) presents the temporal CSI data
of a station. When we gradually zoom into the details specified
by the black rectangle, we see very smooth surface just like
in static environment.
Based on the observation, we design a method called "CSI
Resolution Enhancement" (CRE) to guarantee the delivery of
MF. The core of CRE is that: if we transmit an unprotected MF
M immediately after a group of high frequency "precursor"
data frames, there will be smoothed amplitude surface in
Wr and receiver’s CSITE filter will think it is in a static
environment and accept the M by setting higher i. The sender
repeats this procedure until the delivery succeed.
Formally speaking, for each MF M to be transmitted,
we define a frame stream Sj = {D0, D1, ..., Dlj ,M} with
minimum transmission interval between frames, where Di are
encrypted data frames. Sj is the j-th transmission procedure.
We repeat this procedure until the frame M is successfully
transmitted.
Since the proportion of MF in normal communication is
small, we adopt a simple yet robust power-based scheme to
guarantee the delivery. Suppose both sides keep the same k
and LW , the lj is expected to be:
lj = 2
j × (l1 + 1), j ∈ (2, 3..., N), lj ≤ LW (3)
This scheme simplifies the problem, and we only need to
determine the initial value l1, which is a fixed value in current
prototype.
Negative ACK encapsulated in Echo Request: There is a
firmware-level limit: we have no control on the transmission
of ACK frame. The firmware will emit the ACK frame even if
the frame is rejected by the CSITE filter, therefore transmitter
cannot determine if the delivery is successful.
We adopt an ad hoc solution to inform the transmitter.
Every time a frame does not pass the CSI filter, the receiver
will immediately send a Negative-ACK to inform the sender.
Such N-ACK is carried in a ICMP "ECHO REQUEST" frame
whose echo content indicates the the failed frame type and
sequence number, like "PROBE_REQUEST@42316". Since
the frame is encrypted, only genuine transmitter can learn this
N-ACK and start re-transmission as described above. However
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Fig. 3. (a). Original view of CSI under highly dynamic environment. (b), (c), and (d) provide gradually zoomed views for the details circled by black box.
if such N-ACK emits for a spoofing attack, the genuine station
will be aware of being forged and may trigger alarm.
We mention again that this ad hoc solution exists only
because we have no control on the ACK frames.
IV. PROTOTYPE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Prototype System Setup
Our prototype system consists of 3 laptops equipped with
Intel 5300 NICs. Two of them form an AP-Client network, and
the rest one acts as an attacker. Their drivers are all modified
to enable them to transmit (or inject) management frames in
HT rate in compliance to IEEE 802.11n standard.
B. Attacking Test Setting
In order to fully evaluate the performance of CSITE filter
and make comparison to RSS based detection, we designed test
cases and applied them in 7 typical scenarios. The description
of them is presented in Table I. Scenarios A, B, and C test
the performance when the client is stationary while channel
dynamics are gradually increasing. D to F test the performance
when client is moving with different speeds. G presents the
last test that both client and attacker are moving.
TABLE I
TEST SCENARIOS DESCRIPTION
A Both the client and attacker are stationary in a controlled
environment.
B Same as A, but there is some channel dynamics caused
by crowd flow.
C The client is stationary, while the attacker is moving
around. No crowd flow.
D The client is moving, while the attacker is stationary.
speed is normal.
E The same as D, but moving speed is slow.
F The same as D, but moving speed is fast.
G Both the client and attacker are moving, speed normal.
We run a test for each scenario and each test lasts for 5
minutes. During the test, the AP and the client are continuously
updating the CSI pattern using the ping command. Besides the
data stream generated by ping command, the client initiates
20 Probe Requests to the AP every 0.3s, and the AP replies
20 Probe Responses to the client immediately. Both Probe
Request/Response are MFs and they form the un-encrypted
stream Sm.
The attacker uses aireplay-ng to inject 64 forged de-
authentication frames to the client every 0.5s using the AP’s
MAC address. During the attack, the Txpower is scanning
from 1dBm to 15dBm in a loop. For the sake of convenience,
we set a switch in the client to prevent the connection being
really de-authenticated once the client wrongfully accepts the
forged de-authentication frames.
For each test case, we mainly focus on two error rates: FP
error rate and FN error rate. Specifically, the FP error rate is the
number of de-authentication frames which are considered to be
sent from legitimate station over the totally received number of
de-authentication frames. Similarly, the FN rate is the number
of Probe Responses that are considered to be suspicious over
the totally received number of Probe Responses.
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C. Compared to RSS-based Authentication
To make a fair comparison between CSITE and RSS-based
detection, we turn off the dynamic threshold scaling (DTS)
function and set the default value for i = 75. Fig.4 presents
the error comparison between CSITE and RSS-based detection
in different scenarios. In stationary scenarios A, B, and C, due
to the strong measurement noise, RSS-based detection yields
an FP error rate about 6%, while CSITE achieves perfect 0
FP error rate. In motion scenarios, CSITE accepts only about
2% attacking frames, while RSS-based detection accepts more
than 17% attacking frames. It is about 8 times improvement
made by CSITE over the RSS-based detection.
D. Impacts of various parameters
To identify the impacts of various parameters, we still turn
off the DTS function and use default values k = 5, λ = 1,
Lw = 40, i = 75 for the rest of evaluations if not specifically
mentioned.
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1) Impact of update frequency fs: To test the impact of fs,
we vary the sampling rate fs from 1Hz to 400Hz by uniformly
dropping frames in the data stream. Fig.5 illustrates the FP and
FN error rates in different scenarios when fs is increasing.
In stationary scenarios, the FP and FN error rates drop to
0 rapidly when fs is increasing. For motion scenarios, the
FP error rate drops to about 5% when fs ≥ 100Hz. When
fs ≥ 400Hz, the FP error rate is not higher than 3% even
under most intensive dynamics in scenario G.
However, we should mention that in normal communication
the DTS function is turned on, the CSITE filter could reject al-
most all attacking frames even when fs is very low, as verified
by our results in Impact of Dynamic Threshold Scaling.
2) Impact of the number of nearest neighbors k: Fig.6
shows the combined impact of k and fs on the error rate
in scenarios A and G. Since τ is partly determined by the
time-gained distance of the latest accepted points, k and fs
play an important role for deciding which points are taken into
account. According to Fig.6(a) and (b), higher k could reduce
the error rate when in stationary situation. In motion scenarios,
however, lower k is better. This is because higher k in this case
will introduce more non-related CSI points, which become
noises when determining the τ . Based on the test conducted
in all scenarios, we believe k = 5 is a suitable value for both
the stationary and the motion scenarios.
3) Impact of sliding window length Lw: Fig.7 presents
the combined effect of sliding window length LW and k on
scenarios A and G. In both the stationary and the motion
situations, increasing LW is generally good for reducing error
rate, but the marginal effect is reduced since the CSITE filter
is tuned to choose the most recently accepted points. When
LW > 40 +k, the benefit of increasing LW can be ignored in
all scenarios, therefore we set LW = k+40 for both accuracy
and efficiency.
4) Impacts of Dynamic Threshold Scaling: Apparently,
lower threshold τ determined by i rejects not only the at-
tacking frames but also some legitimate frames which deviate
from the trend center. However, a lower i is preferred since
the premier goal of CSITE is to reject the attacking frames.
Recall the DTS function introduced in Section III, Fig.8(a)
shows the average window variance σW for different scenarios
and frequencies. Fig.8(b) shows the dynamic percentile i
calculated according to σW . The impact to the error rate is
shown in Fig.8(c) We see that the FP error rates quickly drops
to 0 in stationary scenarios. For the most dynamic scenario G,
FP error rate drops to astonishingly 5% when fs = 5Hz, and
The FP error rates drop to 1.53% when fs = 20Hz.
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Fig. 8. (a) shows the calculated percentile i according to σW . (b) and (c) present the corresponding FP and FN error rates using the percentile i shown in
(a).
E. Evaluation on MF transmission assurance system
To fully evaluate the transmission of MF in different fs
and scenarios, the data frames before the precursor frames are
randomly dropped to simulate different fs, and the length of
precursor frames Lpre varies from 0 to LW .
Fig.IV-E(a) and (b) present the MF transmission success
rate comparison with different amount of precursor frames in
scenarios A and G. Since DTS function is turned on, many FN
errors are generated when fs is low. However, with the help
of precursor frames, we can see that even when fs = 5Hz,
with the length Lpre = Lw, 90% and 78.5% one-shot success
(Transmission of M succeeds with only one transmission) rate
can be achieved in scenarios A and G. When fs = 40Hz,
97.3% and 90.1% one-shot success rate can be achieved.
V. DISCUSSIONS
Driver Enhancement: In Intel IWL5300 NIC driver, there
are some codes dealing with rate control for different situa-
tions. In our prototype, the rate control is modified to transmit
the MFs using the same MCS rate of latest successful HT
transmission. If it fails (no ACK reply), both precursor data
frames and MF will be transmitted in the lowest MCS value in
the "BasicMCSSet" to ensure the success delivery. We mention
again that these modifications are permitted according to the
"Multirate Support" in 802.11n Specification [27] Clause 9.6.
Source authentication for control frame: Theoretically, if
CSI value could be obtained for control frame, similar source
authentication could be applied to control frames. However,
it is currently impossible to achieve this goal, since the ACK
feedback mechanism is hard-coded in firmware which is a
binary file compiled from closed-source code.
Vulnerability of Man-In-The-Middle Attack: Since CSITE
detects spoofing MFs based on the CSI of encrypted data
frames, if the data frames are replayed in physical layer,
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack may succeed. To launch
MITM, the attacker must be able to jam the paired stations
and simultaneously tunnel their traffic through the attacker.
To detect such attacks, users only need to open a virtual
monitor interface. If these is the jamming, the overheard flows
to different address will disappear simultaneously, which is
impossible in normal situation. This mitigates the impact of
MITM attack. However, we believe in most of attack scenarios,
such kind of powerful attacker does not exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Management frame, the basis for operating 802.11 net-
work normally, is extremely vulnerable to attacks. Spoofing
detection without cooperative information is unreliable using
existing methods. Based on off-the-shelf hardware, we design
CSITE, a Wi-Fi management frame source authentication
system. It leverages the unique characteristics of CSI to verify
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the authenticity of MFs, and the detection is tuned to be
highly strict for False Positive (FP) errors. To guarantee the
successful delivery of MFs even under most intensive channel
dynamics, we devise a method called CRE, which makes the
MFs pass the detection with the help of precursor frames.
Extensive evaluations are conducted to verify the performance
of our system. These evaluations show excellent authentication
ability and strong rejection against spoofing attacks.
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